


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Strategic Research Monthly Review

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⊕ Strategic Research Monthly Review

August 1975

This publication of the Office of Strategic Research contains substantive findings and analytical judgments that are preliminary in nature and have not been formally coordinated with other CIA and intelligence community components.

Comments and queries regarding the articles are welcomed. They may be directed to the person named following each item.

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and almost entirely negative. The Soviets have been most immediately concerned about adverse political implications for US-Soviet detente. They also fear that this policy could encourage new US weapons programs and express serious skepticism that any nuclear conflict could be kept limited. Nevertheless, representatives of Soviet foreign policy institutes have suggested that the Soviets are developing plans for their own limited nuclear options.

**Brezhnev: First in Peace,
First in War**

14

In time of war Brezhnev will become the Supreme Commander in Chief of the Soviet Armed Forces, according to a Soviet military officer on the SALT Standing Consultative Commission. This information helps clarify conflicting evidence about Brezhnev's wartime role.

**Deliveries of SA-9 Proceeding
at Brisk Rate**

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
The SA-9 is being introduced into Soviet and East European forces at a faster rate than any other vehicle-mounted SAM system currently being deployed. Most Soviet divisions in East Germany and the western USSR have received the system.

**Soviet Commentary on Strategy of Limited
Nuclear Options—The "Schlesinger Doctrine"** 11

Soviet commentary on the US policy of limited nuclear options, announced by Defense Secretary Schlesinger in January 1974, has been infrequent



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the surplus in the civilian economy could mean that Soviet military personnel will be used less in agricultural work.



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Ruble Cost Estimates for Soviet Naval Ships Revised Upward

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A methodology developed over the past year for estimating the ruble cost of Soviet naval ships indicates that previous estimates were substantially understated. It also indicates that the Soviet shipbuilding industry is not nearly as efficient relative to that of the US as was implied by the earlier ruble cost estimates.

Soviet Conscripts Offered Alternative Service

22

Alternatives to military service in the form of work on collective farms or at motor transport enterprises are reportedly being offered to Soviet conscripts. The armed forces may be unable to absorb the large number of 18-year-olds becoming eligible for military service each year, and use of

Portuguese Military Effectiveness Impaired by Political Shocks

27

The efforts of the Armed Forces Movement since April 1974 to remake Portugal's armed forces in a revolutionary mold have undoubtedly been aimed at providing a reliable arm of support for the policies of the government. The ultimate effect may be, however, to degrade the effectiveness of the armed services for any military purpose, foreign or domestic.

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Soviet Commentary on Strategy of Limited Nuclear Options—The "Schlesinger Doctrine"

Soviet commentary on the US policy of limited nuclear options, announced by Defense Secretary Schlesinger in January 1974, has been infrequent and almost entirely negative. The Soviets have been most immediately concerned with the potentially adverse political implications for US-Soviet detente that they read into high-level public treatment of this subject in the US. They also fear that this policy could encourage new US weapons programs and express serious skepticism that any nuclear conflict could be kept limited. Despite their apparent hostility to what they call the "Schlesinger Doctrine" or "retargeting," representatives of Soviet foreign

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policy institutes have suggested that the Soviets are developing plans for their own limited nuclear options.

First Reactions. Soviet commentators publicly and privately have cited the Secretary's statements as evidence of persisting opposition to detente in the US. Neither the political nor the military leadership, however, has made any detailed public comment. Military writers have criticized Secretary Schlesinger, but have made only oblique reference to the new nuclear weapons employment policy. They have implied that the proposed "creation of a new generation of nuclear missile weapons" and the "urge on the part of the militarists to make nuclear war acceptable" are adequate justifications for strengthening the Soviet military potential. Chief of the General Staff V. Kulikov, the only senior military official to have commented publicly thus far, echoed this same line.

At the SALT II negotiations in Geneva, Soviet delegates have barely touched upon what was widely labeled the "retargeting issue." In late September 1974, Ambassador Semenov explained that "under instruction" from his government, he had to inform the US delegation that the new strategic weapons policy was viewed by Moscow with "distrust and concern."

The only sector of the Soviet hierarchy to have commented extensively on this issue has been the Institute of the USA and Canada, one of the foreign policy "think tanks" of the Academy of Sciences. IUSAC analysts routinely assert that the "Schlesinger doctrine" contradicts the trend toward detente and is contrary to the spirit of the Treaty for the Prevention of Nuclear War, signed in 1973.

Soviet commentators such as G. A. Arbatov, director of IUSAC, argue that attempts by certain segments of the American polity to draw up rules and limitations "by agreements" are illusory and inadequate. They contend that limited nuclear war, once begun, will probably grow into a universal war.

These same analysts have attacked the new US policy as a destabilizing move signaling US abandonment of mutual assured destruction in favor of an attempt to reacquire a nuclear war-fighting capability. They have noted the resemblance of the revised targeting doctrine to former Defense Secretary McNamara's city-avoidance policy of the early 1960s, and point out that attempts are now being made to "legitimize limited nuclear strikes against targets actually located on the national territory of the two major nuclear powers."

The "Schlesinger doctrine" is also described as a "counterforce strategy with first-strike options" which can only fuel the action-reaction cycle of the arms race. Specifically, it is cited as a rationale for further modernization of US strategic nuclear weapons through qualitative improvements, which IUSAC analysts contend will have to be matched by the USSR.

G. A. Trofimenko, chief of a foreign policy department of the IUSAC, differed somewhat from his colleagues when he argued that "retargeting" was "specifically

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designed... to exert psychological pressure on the USSR." The only other deviation from the routine criticism of the "Schlesinger doctrine" prior to the Vladivostok Summit was the comments offered by Col. V. Kullish, a former member of the General Staff, who now holds a position with one of the foreign policy institutes. Kullish told US Embassy officials that he found nothing new in the targeting doctrine described by Schlesinger and would have been surprised had the US not been following such a policy.

Post-Vladivostok Treatment. Shortly after Vladivostok, Trofimenko told Embassy officials that from the Soviet point of view, the main danger in the "Schlesinger doctrine" had been that it established the need for more targets and would therefore create a need for more warheads "on both the US side and the Soviet side." He claimed that the large numbers of warheads allotted both sides under the terms of the Vladivostok accord served to diminish this concern. He added that the Soviet side could now begin moving towards a similar strategy, even though public commentary would "continue to be negative." Soviet public and private commentary after Trofimenko made his remarks was even more infrequent than in 1974.

Recent Comments. Soviet criticism of the new policy stresses the continuity in the development of US doctrine and uses many of the epithets used by Soviet publicists throughout the sixties, but lacks the frequency and intensity of that earlier period. This may be due, in part, to Soviet consideration of US sensitivities in an era of detente. It probably also reflects developments in Soviet tactical and strategic nuclear capabilities and military doctrine. The Soviets have begun to explore the concepts of limited nuclear employment for European conflict and may have already begun to incorporate these concepts into their plans and doctrine for theater warfare.

Members of the US delegation to the Third Soviet-American Symposium (SRI-IUSAC-IMEMO) held 9 to 13 June 1975 in California noted that there was less discussion of the "Schlesinger doctrine" than at the previous symposium in September 1974. Col. D. M. Proyektor, of the Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), claimed that the "Schlesinger doctrine" enhances the legitimacy of nuclear war and is consequently a dangerous political element. V. V. Zhurkin, deputy director of IUSAC, claimed that retargeting "does not change the situation militarily" but is nevertheless a "destabilizing political element" because it "makes the Soviet Union think of increasing its own capabilities." Both men intimated, however, that the Soviets have "plans for escalation," are seriously studying limited intercontinental strikes, and would not necessarily respond to a limited nuclear attack with a total strike.

Some of the US delegates gained the impression that the Soviet Union is taking steps for the implementation of limited nuclear options ranging "from one through the whole spectrum of nuclear weapons." Nevertheless, the Soviets remain extremely skeptical that strikes on home territories could be limited for more than a short time.

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On 4 July 1975, shortly after a widely publicized interview in which Secretary Schlesinger contemplated an initial use of nuclear weapons against Soviet targets, Soviet media began to focus on the Secretary and, to a lesser extent, on the new US nuclear employment policy. *Pravda* (12 July) and other commentaries have stressed that the "Schlesinger doctrine" is contrary to the prevailing spirit of détente but, significantly, have not called for increased Soviet military preparedness as a counter to the "Schlesinger doctrine."

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Brezhnev: First in Peace, First in War

In time of war Soviet Communist Party General Secretary Brezhnev will become the Supreme Commander in Chief of the Soviet Armed Forces, according to a Soviet military officer on the SALT Standing Consultative Commission (SCC).

The Soviet officer recently told a US adviser to the SCC that Defense Minister Grechko is now commander in chief and would remain so as long as the Soviet Union is not at war. He went on to say that in the event of war Brezhnev would follow Stalin's example and assume command of the armed forces, becoming chairman of the Stavka, the wartime organization of military and political leaders which constitutes the Supreme High Command.

This new information is consistent with statements by high-ranking Soviet officers in the mid-1960s, shortly after Khrushchev's ouster, when Brezhnev was identified as the wartime commander. In 1966 and 1967, however, a number of articles appeared [redacted] that seemed to conflict with this description of Brezhnev's wartime role.

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The articles reflected the military high command's concern about a lack of command authority in the event of an emergency. The military apparently wanted a predesignated supreme commander in chief, a source of political-military authority to whom they could turn in emergencies, and expressed the need for an institutionalized supreme command in peacetime, capable of timely response in military crisis situations. Brezhnev, however, was emphasizing collectivity in leadership matters, as he still does to some degree. Unlike Khrushchev and Stalin before him, he seemed to shun public identification as "supreme commander in chief." In fact, a remark identifying the General Secretary as supreme commander in chief designate in the 1963 and 1964 editions of Sokolovskiy's *Military Strategy* was deleted from the 1968 edition. Even now, when Brezhnev is clearly in a position of political preeminence, his identification as supreme commander in chief only in wartime highlights the political sensitivity of the position.

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

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The consistency of the new explanation with earlier information indicates that Brezhnev has been designated as wartime commander since at least 1965. Apparently the central issue of the controversy in 1966-67 was not the need for a supreme commander in chief, but rather the need for an institutionalized supreme command even in peacetime. The Soviet SCC officer's reference to the Stavka is one of many from a variety of sources which have appeared in this context since 1967. This may indicate that a Stavka-like supreme command was formally established by late 1967.

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
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Deliveries of SA-9 Proceeding at Brisk Rate

The SA-9 is being introduced into Soviet and East European forces at a faster rate than any other vehicle-mounted SAM system currently being deployed. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] The Soviets probably intend to supply this system to most of their divisions and to export its extensively.

The SA-9 transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) consists of a missile launcher mounted on a wheeled, amphibious BRDM-2 scout car, which is capable of speeds up to 60 miles per hour over paved roads. The system can be airlifted more easily and offers more flexibility in various combat roles than other vehicle-mounted SAMs. The TEL carries four heat-seeking missiles—NATO codename Gaskin—which are similar to the SA-7 Grail but larger, with better capabilities, particularly against fixed-wing aircraft.

Combat Roles and Capabilities. The Soviets initially deployed the SA-9 to provide battlefield air defense for rapidly moving combat units. They are aware of the developing NATO helicopter-borne antitank missile threat, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] It is also capable of engaging fixed-wing aircraft flying at speeds of up to 600 knots.

The antiaircraft batteries of most Soviet regiments have four SA-9 TELs, along with four ZSU-23/4 self-propelled AAA guns and associated support vehicles. The ZSU-23/4 and SA-9 work in combination like the US Vulcan-Chaparral systems, in which a rapid-fire AAA gun complements a low-altitude missile.




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
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SA-9 Missile System

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The composition of a naval infantry antiaircraft battery will probably be similar to that of a ground force regiment's antiaircraft battery—four SA-9 TELs and four ZSU-23/4s.

Deployment. The Soviets are supplying the SA-9 to their divisions in large numbers. Most Soviet divisions in East Germany and the western USSR now have the system. In the past year, deployment of the SA-9 has proceeded faster than that of the SA-4, SA-6, or SA-8. There are currently about 500 SA-9 TELs in Soviet units and about 100 in national units in the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries. The SA-9 was first introduced to Soviet forces in 1968, but extensive deployment to East European countries did not occur until the early 1970s. To date, the system has been delivered to the national forces of three East European countries—Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany.

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
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Production of
this relatively low-cost, versatile air defense system will probably extend into the
early 1980s to fully equip Soviet divisions and meet expected export demands.

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Ruble Cost Estimates for Soviet Naval Ships Revised Upward

A methodology developed over the past year for estimating the ruble costs of Soviet naval ships indicates that the USSR has spent more than twice as much on its surface combatants as previously estimated. The methodology is based on Soviet maritime cost planning factors that appeared in recent unclassified Soviet publications. Analysis has shown that these factors may be applied to naval surface combatants for estimating the construction cost for the basic ship—total cost less weapons and electronics. (As yet, the factors cannot be used for generating submarine costs.) The published information provides a basis for calculating directly and individually the costs of the hull, propulsion, mechanical equipment, and construction services for several types of merchant ships. New estimates based on this information are believed to be more reliable than previous estimates of Soviet ship construction expenditures which were developed by converting estimated dollar costs into rubles using a ruble-to-dollar ratio.

Applying Cost Planning Factors. Each of the four component groups considered in calculating basic ship costs—which are comparable to the component

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groups used in US Navy cost planning—contains many different items. Each component group is subject to some principal cost drivers:

- The cost of the hull, with the ship's general equipment, is a function of the purpose of the ship and its light displacement.
- The cost of the main propulsion is based on the number and type of engines, power, rpm, and type of transmission.
- The cost of mechanical equipment is dependent on the purpose of the ship, the type and power of the main engine, and the number of shafts.
- The cost of construction services depends on the purpose of the ship and its light displacement.

Merchant Ships as Surrogates. The cost planning factors published by the Soviets are intended for use in estimating the costs of merchant ships. Construction practices in Soviet shipyards, however, are the same for naval ships and merchant ships. In addition, analysis of US ship costs has shown that cost-estimating relationships developed from merchant ship experience can be used to reliably estimate naval basic ship construction costs. Studies show there is little difference between the basic ship costs of US naval ships and merchant ships of similar size; the higher complete cost of naval ships is almost all attributable to costs of outfitting, armament, electrical and electronic equipment, and auxiliary machinery.

In estimating the costs for Soviet naval ships, a merchant ship analog is chosen whose hull design and ship configuration most nearly match those of the naval ship. Adjustments to the estimated costs are made to take account of special characteristics built into the naval ships—for example, ice reinforcement, high-strength steel, or reduction gear. The derived cost is also modified to reflect the larger crew required for a given naval ship than for the analogous commercial ship.

The final step is the determination of the average cost of each ship in a class of naval ships. This is dependent upon the number of ship units, the number of shipyards engaged, and the distribution of units among the yards. This method takes into account the effects of economies of scale on the production cost.

Effects of New Methodology. Using this direct cost methodology, the costs in rubles of most Soviet naval surface combatants have been estimated. Compared to previous estimates the new estimates, over all, are more than twice as high for the basic ship. When matched against present estimated dollar costs of Soviet ships, the substantially higher ruble cost estimates for procurement of ships imply that Soviet shipbuilding is not nearly as efficient relative to that of the US as implied by earlier analysis.

Direct cost estimates in rubles provide, in addition, the basis for deriving a new ratio for converting into rubles those categories of naval expenditures that must be estimated initially in dollars.

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
Soviet Conscripts Offered Alternative Service

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[redacted] there is now an alternative to military service in the form of work on collective farms or at motor transport enterprises. This is the first indication that a draft-eligible male might avoid military service by performing other state-approved service.

Legal Obligation. The Universal Military Service Law of 1967 grants deferments of induction into military service for reasons relating to educational, medical, and family circumstances. There are no other legal means of avoiding military service in the USSR. To make the obligation as universal as possible, the Soviets go to great lengths to correct physical defects that would keep youths out of the service, including surgery and hospital treatment on a priority basis beginning as early as age 16. Deferments for the continuation of education and for family hardship cases are reviewed periodically. With the loss of a deferment through a change in situation, the individual is subject to conscription until age 27.

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Rationale. The reason alternative service is offered [redacted] may be that the growing number of youths eligible for conscription in the USSR now exceeds the needs of the military. Approximately 2.5 million youths will

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reach draft age this year. The number has grown from a low of 970,000 in 1963 and probably will peak in 1978 at 2.6 million. The sizable surplus implied by this growth suggests that the Soviets could develop a widespread program of alternative service.

Although the law on universal military service states that all male citizens must perform active military service in the ranks of the armed forces, alternative service fulfills the spirit of the law and allows for the placement of what may well be a surplus of conscripts in areas where their services may be more profitably used. Each year the Soviet military supplies thousands of personnel and vehicles to help with the harvesting of crops, particularly grain and sugar beets. By directing youths to participate in agricultural or motor transport work in lieu of military service the Soviets may eventually be able to eliminate this practice or at least substantially reduce the military's involvement.

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Portuguese Military Effectiveness impaired by Political Shocks

The shocks suffered by the Portuguese armed forces since April 1974 raise the question whether the country's armed services can be depended upon to fulfill any traditional military task.

[redacted] a number of developments since then appear to have seriously degraded the effectiveness of all of the services.

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Political Orientation. A series of purges has removed from the military leadership a number of capable senior officers, who were replaced by men younger and less experienced. Many of the general officers now holding positions of command were majors or captains only a few months ago. Most have had no training for senior command positions. The emphasis in selection for promotion and retention is on correct political orientation—support for the policies of the ruling Armed Forces Movement (AFM)—rather than on professional capability. At least two of the country's six cavalry regiments have been disbanded and reorganized, and some Portuguese suspect that the entire cavalry arm of the army is being dismantled because of its past association with moderate elements.

The situation is complicated by the fact that Portugal, as the end of its colonial involvement draws near, is reducing its military forces from more than 200,000 men

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to fewer than 90,000. AFM leaders are carrying out this restructuring and reduction with various—sometimes conflicting—objectives in mind. They intend to correct the political orientation of the services, to open up leadership positions to frustrated junior officers, to change the mission of the armed forces, and to neutralize, if possible, the negative effect of disaffected soldiers returning from the colonies.

Internal vs Defense Missions. Substantial numbers of personnel and many resources are being committed by all three services to their "dynamization" programs—the political education of troops and civilians and civic action projects designed to promote solidarity between the Armed Forces Movement and the Portuguese people. Direction of these programs is centralized in the General Staff's Fifth Division. The leadership of this organization is strongly leftist, and moderate observers have been concerned that the ultimate objective of dynamization is to build support for a Communist takeover.

The increasing politicization of the military has contributed to a growing confusion as to what sort of external mission the armed forces ought to have. Clearly the current AFM leadership sees advancement of the revolution as the fundamental mission of the military. All three services will be concentrating on such projects as improving medical and sanitation services, road and bridge building, cartography, and forest fire detection and control. An infantry division and four destroyer escorts remain technically committed to NATO, and the government has reiterated its intent to honor that commitment, but Portuguese military leaders are frank to admit that their capability to resist an invasion would be minimal. In this situation, professionally oriented officers are hard pressed to inspire commitment to the traditional defense mission.

Effect on Discipline, Reliability. The effect of AFM policies on normal military discipline has been disastrous. In its efforts to democratize the services, the AFM has instituted procedures requiring commanding officers to obtain the assent of junior and noncommissioned officers for any action they wish to take. AFM elements within units are able to use their separate chain of communication and influence to have decisions overruled.

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While a large number of moderate officers would apparently like to see a "return to the barracks," the feeling is widespread that resistance to the current of developments in the armed forces is fatal. The former air force chief of staff, Mendes

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Dias, was dismissed in May because, it is thought, he advocated a return to professionalism and discipline.

These trends, if they continue, will have serious effects on Portugal's military capabilities. The lack of seasoned leadership, low morale, poor discipline, and the bypassing of the traditional chain of command are clearly of deep concern to Portugal's leaders. A new law promulgated on 27 June allows expulsion of military personnel guilty of disrespect toward superiors or breach of discipline—an apparent attempt to improve the situation.

The ruling Revolutionary Council has attempted through its policies to ensure that the armed forces will be a reliable arm of support for the revolution. Yet the ultimate effect of its actions over the past 16 months may be the impairment of the armed services for any effective military use, foreign or domestic. [REDACTED]

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